Topic of the
conference
Typically,
scientists call subjects they investigate phenomena.
While the notion of a scientific phenomenon is common in science, apart from a
few exceptions, it has not been systematically discussed in philosophy of
science. Even worse, there seem to be two ways the notion is used. On the one
hand, following the ancient astronomical program called “Saving the phenomena”,
scientific phenomena are taken to be observed facts that should be explained.
On the other hand, following Bogen and Woodward (1988), scientific phenomena
are taken to be general non-observable patterns that can be inferred from the
data and should be explained.
The
conference aims at discussing these suggestions, and perhaps others. Should, or
can, the notion be restricted to observable facts? If not, if knowledge about
scientific phenomena is typically gained via inference, are phenomena
theory-laden – and if so in what sense? Are scientific phenomena that are
inferred from data on a par with theoretical entities? How may the notion of a
scientific phenomenon be explicated such that it illuminates the way science
works?
Submissions
We welcome contributed papers on the topic of the conference for 30 min talks followed by 15 discussions. The language of the conference is English. Abstracts of approximately 1000 words should be sent to phaenomene@uni-heidelberg.de by 31 January 2008.